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Abstract
This paper examines lessons obtained by means of simulations in
the form of agent-based models (ABMs) about the norms that are to
guide disagreeing scientists. I focus on two types of epistemic and
methodological norms: (i) norms that guide one’s attitude towards
one’s own theory, and (ii) norms that guide one’s attitude towards the
opponent’s theory. Concerning (i) I look into ABMs that have been
designed to examine the context of peer disagreement. Here I challenge
the conclusion that the given ABMs provide a support for the so-called
Steadfast Norm, according to which one is epistemically justified in re-
maining steadfast in their beliefs in face of disagreeing peers. I argue
that the proposed models at best provide evidence for a weaker norm,
which concerns methodological steadfastness. Concerning (ii) I look
into ABMs aimed at examining epistemic effects of scientific interac-
tion. Here I argue that the models provide diverging suggestions and
that the link between each ABM and the type of represented inquiry is
still missing. Moreover, I examine alternative strategies of arguing in
favor of the benefits of scientific interaction, relevant for contemporary
discussions on scientific pluralism.
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Scientific disagreements are usually considered one of the key conditions of
scientific progress (Kuhn, 1977; Longino, 2002; Solomon, 2006). Neverthe-
less, as many have noted, an inadequate response to disagreements can lead
to premature rejections of fruitful inquiries (Chang, 2012; Sˇesˇelja and Weber,
2012), to fragmentation of scientific domains (Barnes and Sheppard, 2010;
Rolin, 2011), and hence to consequences that are counterproductive for the
progress of science. In light of this, determining epistemic and methodologi-
cal norms that are to guide scientists in their inquiry in face of disagreements
is an important philosophical challenge. Moreover, it is a challenge that may
not be easy to address from a philosophical armchair: estimating how differ-
ent norms guiding individual scientists impact the efficiency of inquiry as a
collective enterprise is a complex issue, depending on a variety of factors and
their mutual interaction. While historical case studies can help in pointing
out examples of disagreements and their possible beneficial or harmful ef-
fects, they are a weak basis for formulating general norms. As a result, the
normative aspect of scientific disagreements has attracted the attention of
scholars employing computer simulations in the form of agent-based models
(ABMs). The primary value of such simulations is that they help in examin-
ing how different norms guiding individual scientists affect the performance
of the given scientific community.1
In this paper I look into lessons obtained from such models, focusing
on two types of norms: on the one hand, those that guide a scientist’s
attitude towards her own theory and on the other hand, those that guide a
scientist’s attitude towards her opponents’ theory, after she has recognized
she is involved in a peer disagreement. While the discussion on these norms
is inspired by the peer disagreement debate in contemporary epistemology,
it comes with certain peculiarities of scientific inquiry. Let’s take a closer
look at these issues.
The primary focus of the peer disagreement debate is the adequate dox-
astic attitude one should hold towards p upon recognizing that one’s peer
disagrees on p. At one end of the spectrum there is the Consilliatory Norm
(CN), demanding one lower the confidence in p, split the difference in the
1Beside the case-study approach and computational methods, empirical studies of sci-
entific disagreements are also becoming employed by the philosophical community (see
e.g. Beebe et al., 2018). Such studies are important not only for the understanding of the
descriptive state of affairs, but they may also serve as a basis for the formulation of norma-
tive conclusions, e.g. if combined with computer simulations that examine counterfactual
scenarios.
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sense of taking the middle ground between the opponent’s belief and one’s
own belief on the issue, or entirely suspend their judgment on p. At the
other end of the spectrum we have the Steadfast Norm (SN), according to
which one should stick to one’s guns and keep the same belief with the same
confidence as before encountering a disagreeing peer.2
Similarly, in the context of scientific inquiry we can ask whether a scien-
tist who has recognized she is involved in a peer disagreement should strive
towards ameliorating the differences with her peer by means of (one of the
versions of) CN, or whether she should remain steadfast. Nevertheless, the
context of scientific inquiry comes with two caveats.
First, attitudes that guide scientists in their inquiry do not concern only
scientists’ beliefs about phenomena in the given scientific domain, but also
their methodological assessments, commitments and preferences (see e.g.
Elgin, 2010). As such they are not subject only to epistemic norms, but
also to instrumental or methodological norms. While epistemic norms are
traditionally understood as addressing the question what one is justified to
believe in view of the available evidence, methodological norms address the
question what one should do to attain the given goals – in this case: which
actions one should perform to achieve scientific goals.3 In view of such an
interplay of epistemic and methodological aspects of inquiry, philosophers of
science have introduced the notion of cognitive attitude when describing atti-
tudes of scientists towards their theories, models, hypotheses, etc.4 (see e.g.
Elliott and Willmes, 2013; Lacey, 2015), aiming to cover both the epistemic
and methodological (including the axiological) dimension of inquiry. For
instance, the attitude of pursuit-worthiness towards a given hypothesis is a
result of both: a retrospective epistemic evaluation, based on the available
2For arguments in favor of CN see e.g. Christensen, 2010; Elga, 2007; Feldman, 2007;
Feldman, 2006; for arguments in favor of SN see e.g. Cruz and Smedt, 2013; Kelp and
Douven, 2012; for reasons why norms are context-dependent see e.g. Christensen, 2010;
Douven, 2010; Kelly, 2010a; Konigsberg, 2012.
3In the literature on (scientific) rationality we often find the third type of assessment:
the axiological one. For instance, Rescher, 1988 distinguishes between epistemic, prac-
tical/instrumental and evaluative rationality. The latter concerns the assessment of our
goals and their conduciveness to some more general ends. A similar point is made by Lau-
dan (1984) in his ‘reticulated model’ of scientific rationality, according to which assessing
scientific goals can be done in terms of their feasibility and the overall fit with the existing
scientific practice. An important point made by both Rescher and Laudan is that all three
types of assessments are interrelated since, e.g. what we believe (or accept) depends on
what we do to obtain evidence, which depends on the goals we have; similarly, what we
do and praise will depend on our beliefs, etc.
4I will henceforth use these notions—theory, hypothesis, model—interchangeably since
the discussion applies to all of them.
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evidence which provides indices that the hypothesis is supported by one’s
background knowledge, preliminary evidence, etc., as well as a prospective
methodological evaluation, based on the insight that there are open lines of
inquiry, that the hypothesis has a programmatic character, etc. (Sˇesˇelja and
Straßer, 2014; Whitt, 1992).
The second issue specific for the context of scientific disagreements is
that beside addressing scientists’ attitudes towards their own theories, it is
also important to address their attitude towards their opponents’ theories.
Should a rivaling theory be epistemically tolerated, engaged with or rather
ignored? These questions lie at the heart of philosophical discussions on
scientific controversies and methodological puzzles arising from them.
As we will see, these two caveats will be of direct relevance for the discus-
sion making the bulk of this paper. Here is how I will proceed. In Section
2 I will look into the lessons we can draw from ABMs concerning norms
guiding one’s attitude towards one’s own theory in face of a peer disagree-
ment. In Section 3 I will do the same for norms concerning one’s attitude
towards one’s opponent’s theory. I conclude the paper in Section 4 by turn-
ing to prospects and limitations of employing ABMs for providing answers
to normative questions about scientific disagreements and controversies.
2 The attitude towards one’s own theory
As mentioned in Section 1, one way to examine whether, and if so, how
scientists should adjust their attitude towards their current theory when
encountering a peer who disagrees with them, is to evaluate the impact of
different norms on the efficiency of the given scientific community. This is
where the methodology of ABMs comes into play: by varying the behavior of
individual agents, we can study emergent properties of the given community.
In this section I will look into two ABMs – by Douven, 2010 and De Langhe,
2013 – designed to tackle this question. After providing a brief overview of
each, I will discuss conclusions that have been drawn from them. Here I
will focus on two issues: first, whether these conclusions can be considered a
robust property in view of results obtained by structurally different ABMs
of scientific inquiry, and second, whether the drawn message is the best
interpretation of the given findings.
2.1 ABMs of peer disagreement
Both Douven’s and De Langhe’s ABMs are enhanced versions of the well-
known Hegselmann and Krause’s (Hegselmann and Krause, 2002, 2005,
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2006) ABM of opinion dynamics. The aim of Hegselmann and Krause’s
(H&K’s) model was to examine the process of consensus formation in a
group of agents who adjust their beliefs by means of different processes of
opinion aggregation.5 Building on H&K’s (2006) model, Douven and De
Langhe represent scientists as truth seeking agents who are trying to deter-
mine the value of a certain parameter τ for which they only know that it lies
in the interval ]0, 1]. While at the beginning of the simulation each agent is
given a certain random value for τ within the interval, throughout the run
of the model agents adjust their beliefs in view of their own research and by
receiving information from some other agents.6 According to Douven and
De Langhe, this makes the model suitable for examining the impact of CN
as the difference-splitting norm, or the lack thereof, representing SN. More
precisely, we can examine the performance of agents in their attempts to
determine the true value of τ a) if they update their beliefs both in view of
their own research and in view of other agents’ opinions (difference-splitting
populations), or b) if they update their beliefs only in view of their own
research (steadfast populations).
Douven’s model suggests that whether difference-splitting is conducive
to efficient inquiry or not is highly context dependent. For instance, when
inquiry is easy (in the sense that agents get information that directly points
at the true value of τ), difference-splitting populations converge on the true
value of τ faster than steadfast populations. Nevertheless, if agents start
receiving noisy data through their own research,7 representing e.g. measure-
5This is the so-called bounded-confidence model in the sense that when adjusting their
opinions agents take into account only those opinions of agents which are sufficiently
similar to their own.
6The update of information is modeled in terms of the following function:





xj(u) + (1− α)τ
where xi(u) is the opinion of agent xi after the u-th update, α ∈]0, 1] is the weighting
factor determining how much the opinions of others and one’s own research influence the
change of one’s belief, τ ∈]0, 1] is the objective value of the parameter, Xi(u) := {j :
|xi(u) − xj(u)| ≤ ε} with ε ∈ [0, 1] being the confidence interval determining the agents
whose opinions are taken into account, and |Xi(u)| the cardinality of Xi(u).
7This is done by slightly adjusting the process of updating:





xj(u) + (1− α)(τ + rnd(ζ))
where rnd(ζ) is a function that gives a unique uniformly distributed real number in the
interval [−ζ,+ζ], where ζ ∈ [0, 1].
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ment errors, there appears to be a trade-off between accuracy and speed.
While steadfast populations get within a moderate distance of the true value
of τ relatively quickly, they don’t improve their accuracy in the subsequent
rounds of the simulation. In contrast, difference-splitting populations end
up closer to the true value of τ but it takes them relatively longer to do so. In
view of this Douven concludes that determining a rational response to peer
disagreement largely depends on empirical issues, underlying the context of
the given disagreement. Moreover, he takes his simulations to provide an ar-
gument against the claim that SN is necessarily irrational, since under some
circumstances (e.g. when time and resources are scarce so that the speed
of inquiry is more important than accuracy) it might be the right norm to
follow.
De Langhe comes to a similar conclusion. His extension of the H&K
model aims to represent longstanding scientific disagreements, typical for the
context of theoretical diversity where there are multiple epistemic systems8
in the given scientific domain. He represents such a diversity by making the
objective value of τ relative to the agent’s epistemic system. In addition,
agents in the model are able to distinguish between (i) beliefs of peers within
their epistemic system and (ii) beliefs of peers outside of their epistemic
system (for technical details see De Langhe, 2013, p. 2552.) The simulations
suggest that there is a trade-off between difference-splitting within one’s
epistemic system and difference-splitting between epistemic systems. More
precisely, in order for each group of agents to converge on the true value
of their τ , it is not beneficial to split the difference with agents from other
epistemic systems.9
2.2 Epistemic vs. methodological steadfastness
It seems then that both of these models provide scenarios in which SN may
be epistemically preferable to CN. Moreover, the robustness of these results
appears to be supported by results obtained by structurally different mod-
els representing theoretical diversity. For instance, the findings of Zollman’s
8De Langhe employs Goldman’s (2010) idea that even though disagreeing peers may
share the evidence concerning the given issue in question, they may not share the evidence
for the epistemic system within which they evaluate the former (object-level) evidence.
9This is however not surprising since difference-splitting with agents from other epis-
temic systems bears information on their own respective τ , while the success of each agent
is measured by how close she gets to τ in her own system. Note that this issue may pose
a more general conceptual problem for De Langhe’s model since it is not clear which epis-
temic benefits are included in the representation of interaction between agents belonging
to different epistemic systems.
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(2010) suggest that extreme initial opinions of agents, making them steadfast
in their inquiries, can help in preventing the community from prematurely
abandoning the better of two theories. A recent enhancement of Zollman’s
model by Frey and Sˇesˇelja, 2018a suggests that equipping agents with a doze
of inertia towards their theories improves the efficiency of their inquiry. Sim-
ilar results have been obtained by the argumentation-based ABM proposed
by Borg et al., 2019, at least under some conditions underlying scientific
inquiry.
Hence, simulations seem to provide a strong argument in favor of SN at
least to the extent that sometimes it may be a better option than CN. Or do
they? In what follows I argue that they do not since the behavior of agents
in all of these models does not represent SN understood as an epistemic
norm, but steadfastness as a methodological norm, compatible with both
SN and CN.
Recall that according to SN one should stick to one’s belief upon discov-
ering a peer who disagrees on the given issue. In Douven’s and De Langhe’s
simulations a non-difference splitting agent will update her hypothesis con-
cerning τ in view of her own evidence, ignoring the beliefs of other agents.
That means that she is steadfast in the sense of sticking to her hypothesis as
a premise guiding her further inquiry. Now, if we assume that agents’ beliefs
are correlated with their pursuit-related attitudes, then it indeed follows
that non-difference splitting agents employ SN. The problem is, however,
that one’s beliefs concerning a given hypothesis do not need to be correlated
with one’s attitude as for whether this hypothesis if worthy of pursuit. As
often discussed in the literature on pursuit worthiness (e.g. Nickles, 2006;
Sˇesˇelja, Kosolosky, and Straßer, 2012; Whitt, 1990, 1992), one may suspend
the judgment on whether hypothesis h is true and yet consider it highly
worthy of pursuit. And the other way around: one may believe h and at
the same time consider it a closed question, not worthy of further pursuit.
Hence, what the non-difference splitting agents in the above models employ
is not steadfastness as an epistemic norm, but as a methodological norm, ac-
cording to which they should not abandon their current hypothesis in face of
a peer disagreement. Instead, they are supposed to retain the methodolog-
ical attitude of pursuit worthiness towards their current hypothesis, which
Fleisher, 2017 has recently dubbed ‘rational endorsement’.10 Such an atti-
tude expresses one’s strong commitment towards the given hypothesis, but
it does not require from one to believe the given hypothesis, nor to remain
10Not to be confused with Hugh Lacey’s notion of endorsement which refers to the
acceptance of hypotheses in the context of application, see Lacey, 2015.
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steadfast in her beliefs towards it. To the contrary, as Fleisher points out,
one may not believe her current hypothesis at all, suspecting it may be false,
or believe the opponent’s hypothesis to be superior, and nonetheless stick
with the former as long as it is a viable option, worthy of further pursuit.
Note, however, that such an attitude is perfectly compatible with CN as
an epistemic norm: one may indeed lower one’s confidence in the belief that
the given hypothesis is true, suspend the judgment on it, or even form her
belief by splitting the difference, and yet not include these updated beliefs
as premises that guide her further inquiry. In order to argue that the results
of the above discussed models provide an argument for SN as an epistemic
norm, one would have to show that the epistemic and the methodological
steadfastness are correlated, that is, that agents employing the (epistemic)
SN are more likely to stick with their current hypothesis than if they don’t
employ this norm. This is however an empirical question, neither addressed
in the context of these ABMs, nor is it self-evident.11 In other words, the
methodological impact of the epistemic SN is absent from the models.12
Altogether, results of various simulations suggest that in some circum-
stances one should not immediately abandon one’s current inquiry upon
encountering a disagreeing peer. Moreover, as we have seen, the benefits
of such methodological steadfastness have been confirmed a robust finding
across various models, at least in certain contexts of inquiry. While this is
not a very surprising result, it remains to be seen whether more can be said
about the conditions under which methodological steadfastness increases ef-
ficiency of inquiry, and those under which it could perhaps be harmful. For
instance, our recent study via an argumentation-based model (Borg et al.,
2019, see below Section 3) suggests that the methodological steadfastness,
represented in the model as ‘cautious decision making’, is beneficial only if
11Even though philosophers have sometimes conjectured what such a relationship may
look like (e.g. Magnus, 2014 suggests that “scientists who cultivate agnosticism might not
pursue their chosen research program with the necessary vigor. The community would
then do better if those individuals fully embraced the presuppositions of their approach.”
(p. 132)), as explained above, the situation is not so simple, and only via a proper empirical
study can we obtain reliable information about this relationship.
12Given that the ABMs in question were originally developed to address issues discussed
in the literature on peer disagreement around 2005, this is not surprising. The whole setup
of the peer disagreement debate revolved around doxastic attitudes, and the importance of
alternative cognitive attitudes has only recently entered the discussion (see e.g. Fleisher,
2018). At the same time, ABMs of scientific inquiry are still typically based on the
assumption that an agent’s beliefs and pursuit-related attitudes are mutually correlated.
While sometimes this may be a harmless idealization, in case differentiating between the
two could have an impact on conclusions we draw from the model, it is important to keep
this distinction in mind.
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the given scientific community has a high degree of connectedness, and if
furthermore, scientists base their pursuit decisions on a specific type of eval-
uation (e.g., when they prefer theories with a larger scope than their rivals,
rather than, for example, theories that are less anomalous than their rivals).
We add, however, that the methodological steadfastness can be additionally
beneficial if we take into account costs related to changing one’s pursued
theory, which can be avoided if scientists preserve a dose of inertia. This
indicates that the impact of methodological steadfastness on the efficiency
of inquiry is still an open question, where both empirical and computational
methods can help to address it.
3 The attitude towards one’s opponent’s theory
While the literature on the epistemology of peer disagreement has been pri-
marily focused on the norms guiding one’s attitude towards one’s own beliefs
upon encountering a disagreeing peer, philosophers of science discussing sci-
entific disagreements have primarily focused on how one should treat the
opponent’s views. In particular, scientific pluralists13 have argued that sci-
entists should interact with their opponents or at least tolerate their views
(see e.g. Chang, 2012; Lacey, 2009; Longino, 2002). In addition, my collab-
orators and I have proposed a normative account of epistemic toleration in
the context of scientific disagreements, arguing that toleration implies in-
teraction (Straßer, Sˇesˇelja, and Wieland, 2015). The basic idea of epistemic
toleration is as follows: upon recognizing indications that the stance of my
opponent is a result of a rational deliberation, I have (i) a duty to treat her
stance in a charitable way, as potentially rational, potentially non-futile and
thus potentially fertile and (ii) a duty to consider my opponent’s stance as
a potentially serious competition and a challenge to my own stance and a
duty to stay in critical correspondence with my opponent (p. 131).
While (critical) interaction among scientists may indeed be beneficial
for their impartiality and the reliability of their knowledge about the cur-
rent state of their field, its impact on the efficiency of inquiry (in the sense
of making the greatest progress with as little resources as possible) is not
so straightforward. For example, is interaction among scientists beneficial
at all times, or are there situations where restricting the information flow
would lead to a more efficient inquiry? Ideally, we would like to have an
empirically informed answer to this question, but this may be hard to come
by. This is where simulations of scientific inquiry may once again come in
13For a recent discussion on different types of scientific pluralism see Sˇesˇelja, 2017.
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handy. And indeed, throughout the last decade a variety of ABMs of scien-
tific interaction has entered the philosophical literature. In this section I will
examine results of three classes of such ABMs (some of which have already
been mentioned in the previous section): those proposed by Zollman and
inspired by his work (Frey and Sˇesˇelja, 2018a; Zollman, 2007, 2010), those
proposed by Grim, Singer and collaborators (Grim, 2009; Grim et al., 2013),
and our argumentation-based ABMs (Borg et al., 2017a,b, 2018, 2019). Af-
ter briefly presenting the basic idea of each of these models, I discuss lessons
that can be drawn from them concerning the effects of interaction on the
efficiency of inquiry, focusing on the reliability of current conclusions and
future prospects of this line of research.
3.1 ABMs of scientific interaction
A common feature of ABMs of scientific interaction is that interaction is
represented in terms of different types of social networks. Different social
networks capture different degrees of connectedness among the members of
a given community (see Figure 1). The representation of other aspects of
scientific inquiry and the information flow among scientists varies from one
model to another.
Figure 1: Three commonly employed social networks, representing an in-
creasing degree of connectedness: a cycle, a wheel and a complete graph.
The nodes in each of the graphs represent agents (or groups of agents), while
edges that connect the nodes represent transmission of information between
two agents (or two groups) (the figure is taken from Borg et al., 2017b,
p. 397).
Social networks and bandit problems. Zollman’s models are based on
the analogy between scientific inquiry and the so-called bandit problems,
well-known in economics and statistics. The latter concern a situation in
which a gambler (or a group of gamblers) is confronted with multiple slot
machines (bandits), which have different probabilities of success, where a
gambler is trying to determine which machine will give her a better pay-
off. This type of uncertainty is similar to the one scientists find themselves
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in when confronted with multiple rivaling hypotheses, where they try to
determine which hypothesis is the best one.
At the beginning of the simulation scientists are assigned random prior
probabilities for two rivaling hypotheses, each of which has a designated
objective probability of success, unknown to the agents-scientists. Agents
always choose to pursue a theory which they consider to be better. During
the simulation they update their beliefs in view of their own findings and
by receiving information from other agents with whom they are connected
in a social network.14 Zollman employs three types of social networks from
Figure 1. His results suggest that the degree of connectedness of the scientific
community is inversely proportional to the success of scientists in converging
on the objectively better hypothesis. The reason why a fully connected
community often fails in converging on the better hypothesis is that initial
findings by scientists may be misleading, and due to the full connectedness,
they may spread quickly throughout the whole community, resulting in a
premature abandonment of the objectively better hypothesis.
As subsequent studies have shown, however, this result holds only for a
small portion of the relevant parameter space (see Rosenstock, O’Connor,
and Bruner, 2017) and only under specific idealizing assumptions concerning
the decision-making by scientists (see Frey and Sˇesˇelja, 2018a). In particu-
lar, if scientists are represented as employing a dose of caution when deciding
if they should abandon their current theory and start pursuing the rivaling
one, the cycle is not anymore superior to the complete graph.15 Interest-
ingly, we also show that adding the assumption that critical interaction is
epistemically beneficial doesn’t on its own help the complete graph to catch
up with the cycle: cautious decision-making appears necessary for such an
14Every round an agent makes 1,000 pulls, each of which can be a success or a failure,
where the probability of success is given by the objective probability of success of the
respective hypothesis. Agents then update their beliefs via Bayesian reasoning (modeled
by means of beta distributions). Note that the model described here is Zollman’s (2010)
model, which is a generalized version of his (2007) one.
15Our enhancement of Zollman’s ABM (Frey and Sˇesˇelja, 2018a) is based on the ob-
servation that, on the one hand, Zollman’s result hinges on the parameter choices for the
objective probability of success of two hypotheses, namely 0.499 and 0.5, and that, on
the other hand, if scientists are considered successful only if they converge on the better
hypothesis, then the difference between the two hypotheses should gradually increase. In
other words, as scientists improve their methodology, they should have a better grasp of
the difference between the rivaling approaches. The corollary of implementing this as-
sumption is that scientists always converge on the better hypothesis, the only question is
how long it takes them to do so. Consequently, efficiency in this model is measured in terms
of time (needed for the successful convergence) rather than in terms of the percentage of
successful runs.
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effect to take place.
Social networks and epistemic landscapes. A result similar to the
‘Zollman effect’ (a superiority of the cycle to the complete graph in terms of
a higher chance of successful convergence) was obtained by a set of models
proposed by Grim, 2009; Grim et al., 2013. Grim and Singer’s models
employ a one-dimensional landscape which represents a range of rivaling
hypotheses in a given domain. Each hypothesis is assigned a certain value
representing its epistemic success, and agents are successful if they manage
to discover the hypothesis with the highest value. At the beginning of the
simulation agents are randomly positioned on the landscape. They learn
the values of a hypothesis either by being positioned on it, or from other
agents with whom they are connected in a social network. In case an agent
learns that a hypothesis of another agent is more successful, she will start
moving towards it.16 The simulations were run for different types of social
networks (such as the cycle and the complete graph) and for different types
of epistemic landscapes.
The results of the model indicate that all the examined networks are
equally successful in case of simpler epistemic landscapes, with smooth
climbs to their peaks, though more connected groups reach their goal faster.
However, in case of landscapes with a narrow hidden peak, the complete
graph performs the worst, while less connected networks, such as the cycle,
perform the best.17 Similarly to Zollman’s model, more connected networks
tend to prematurely abandon exploration, converging onto a local maxi-
mum and leaving the global maximum undiscovered. This conclusion seems
to support the thesis that the Zollman effect is more likely to occur in con-
ditions in which discovering the optimal hypothesis is more difficult.
Social networks and argumentative dynamics. The robustness of the
above results is challenged by the findings obtained with our argumentation-
based ABM (ArgABM) (Borg et al., 2017b, 2018). ArgABM aims to capture
the argumentative nature of scientific interaction, typical for the context
of theoretical diversity and scientific disagreements. The model employs
an ‘argumentative landscape’, representing rivaling research programs in a
16Agents move with the speed of 0.5, approximating her target halfway each round with
the probability of 0.5 (the latter represents inertia of the agent). Each time an agent
moves, she jumps to a random region within four points either side of the target spot.
This represents a shaking hand phenomenon, namely, an attempt at replicating the target
hypothesis which may give slightly different results (Grim, 2009, Section 3).
17Grim, 2009 shows that there is a threshold below which lower connected networks
begin to perform worse.
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given domain, which scientists gradually explore.18
Each theory (or a research program) is modeled as a (rooted) tree consist-
ing of a number of arguments – represented abstractly as nodes in a directed
graph, connected by a ‘discovery relation’. The discovery relation stands for
paths that agents take when moving on the landscape, from one argument to
another. The argumentative dynamics in the model comes into play through
the presence of ‘argumentative attacks’ that occur between different theo-
ries: an argument belonging to one theory can attack an argument of one of
the rivaling theories. Roughly speaking, an argument in a theory is consid-
ered defended if it is not attacked, or if there is another defended argument
in the same theory, which attacks the attacker-argument.19 Throughout the
simulation agents gather knowledge about the objective landscape by learn-
ing arguments in favor of each theory, as well as attacks on these arguments.
In addition to gathering knowledge on their own, they also learn about the
landscape from other agents with whom they are linked in a social network.
The model employs networks with different degrees of connectedness, such
as those in Figure 1. In view of this knowledge, agents evaluate the theories.
Since the landscape is pre-defined in such a way that one theory is fully
defended from all the attackers on it (in the objective landscape, unknown
to the agents at the beginning of the simulation), the success of inquiry is
measured in terms of the percentage of runs in which agents successfully
converge on this theory20.
In contrast to the previous models, the results of ArgABM don’t indicate
the Zollman effect. To the contrary, the degree of the connectedness of
agents is directly proportional to their success in converging on the best
theory, under a variety of conditions.
18Both the landscape and the decision-making of agents in the model are inspired by
Abstract Argumentation Frameworks, pioneered by Dung, 1995 and previously used for
the modeling of scientific debates in our (Sˇesˇelja and Straßer, 2013).
19More precisely, a subset of arguments A of a given theory T is admissible iff for each
attacker b of some a in A there is an a′ in A that attacks b. An argument a in T is said
to be defended in T iff it is a member of the maximally admissible subset of T (note that
each theory in the model is conflict-free in the sense that no two arguments in it attack
one another).
20In (Borg et al., 2018) we also present an alternative, pluralist criterion of success,
according to which a community is successful if at the end of the run the best theory
doesn’t have fewer agents than either of the rivaling theories (p. 295; the results of
ArgABM simulations are usually obtained by employing a landscape consisting of three
theories, though they are similar if the number of theories is reduced to two).
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3.2 Different models, different types of inquiry?
What can we then conclude in view of ABMs of scientific interaction about
the conduciveness of interaction to the efficiency of inquiry? The variety of
results suggest not only that the answer may be highly context-dependent,
but that at this point we cannot draw any reliable normative conclusion.
While under certain conditions a high degree of interaction may increase
the risk of a premature abandonment of fruitful hypotheses, under different
conditions such a risk may be rather low. This means that in order to
determine which results are relevant for actual scientific practice (in all its
variety) it is essential to specify the type of inquiry represented by each of
the given models.
This can be done by, on the one hand, analyzing structural differences be-
tween the models. For instance, the success of fully connected communities
in ArgABM is due to the way information and knowledge are represented in
the model (for a more detailed discussion see Borg et al., 2019). In particu-
lar, the accuracy of a scientist’s assessment of the given theories depends on
how much knowledge of the landscape she has, where larger gaps in knowl-
edge can easily result in an erroneous theory assessment. Given that agents
share only recently acquired information (rather than their full knowledge
of the landscape), scientists in less connected communities may easily have
a permanent information loss and end up with a ‘patchy’ knowledge of the
theories. In contrast, in Zollman’s model any shared information is repre-
sentative of the whole theory, and as a result, information losses are much
less harmful. Hence, these two scenarios correspond to different types of
inquiry.
On the other hand, beside specifying the target the model seems to
represent (in this case, a specific type of inquiry), it is important to em-
pirically embed the model in order to provide further evidence that it is
indeed informative of the given phenomena.21 Such a process of empirically
embedding ABMs of science includes at least one of the following methods:
(i) empirical calibration – using empirical data to constrain the parameters
in the model; (ii) theoretical embedding – using theoretical accounts from
philosophy of science, sociology and psychology to inform the assumptions
in the model; and (iii) empirical validation – the analysis and comparison
21This is important even in case of models that aim to provide a how-possibly explana-
tion of the given target since not all possibilities are interesting in the sense that we can
derive from them relevant information about real-world phenomena (see Frey and Sˇesˇelja,
2018b) and may instead amount only to ‘just so stories’ (Verreault-Julien, 2018) or ‘model
based story telling’ (Arnold, 2006).
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of a simulated macro behavior with the real-world macro behavior (Boero
and Squazzoni, 2005; Casini and Manzo, 2016; Sˇesˇelja, 2018). For instance,
a model of scientific interaction could be calibrated by taking into account a
typical size of the given community of scientists (e.g. by using blibliometric
data, such as the number of authors who have published in the given do-
main within a certain time period). Next, the behavior of scientists could
be constrained in view of empirical studies suggesting how often scientists
exchange information, what kind of information is exchanged, etc.22 Fi-
nally, we could attempt to validate the model with respect to its predictive
accuracy (Thicke, 2018) where we measure how well it reproduces certain
patterns of group behavior (e.g. the dynamics of consensus formation in the
relevant historical episodes). Another way to empirically validate ABMs is
by means of experimental studies (such as those by Mason and Watts, 2012;
Mason, Jones, and Goldstone, 2008)23
Hence, despite the tendency in the philosophical literature to consider
ABMs as ‘valid unless proven otherwise’, what exactly such ABMs repre-
sent (which type of inquiry) and how relevant these conclusions are for actual
scientific practice remains completely open in the absence of validation pro-
cedures. In the lack of validation, we should consider these models to be
exploratory, having the status of theoretical abstractions (Boero and Squaz-
zoni, 2005; Sˇesˇelja, 2018). As such, they can provide theoretical insights
about scientific rationality (rather than providing explanations of cases from
actual scientific practice), though the exact value of such theoretical insights
remains a contested issue (see e.g. Arnold, 2013).
3.3 How to argue for scientific pluralism?
But where does this leave proponents of scientific pluralism, mentioned at
the beginning of this section? What can they conclude, if anything, in
view of the above discussed models? Let’s note that there are two types of
arguments that can be used in favor of the pluralist methodology, that is,
for the norm that scientists should tolerate rivaling approaches and interact
22Clearly, beside descriptively adequate representation, a model can incorporate coun-
terfactual assumptions if examining them is interesting from a normative perspective (e.g.
we could use simulations to compare different types of information sharing and their rel-
ative impact on the efficiency of the given community).
23Experiments may however represent a different target phenomenon than the given
model, and moreover, further studies may give conflicting results. For instance, the study
by Mason, Jones, and Goldstone, 2008 suggesting that less connected networks have a
better problem-solving performance than the fully connected ones was subsequently chal-
lenged by Mason and Watts, 2012 who found the opposite to be the case.
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with their proponents:24
1. On the one hand, we can defend this norm in terms of its conduciveness
to scientific (cognitive and non-cognitive) goals of individual scientists,
such as their reliability, impartiality, (Lacey, 2013, 2014) or certain
types of scientific objectivity (Douglas, 2009), etc.
2. On the other hand, we can defend the norm in terms of its conducive-
ness to the communal scientific (cognitive and non-cognitive) goals,
such as the efficiency in collective knowledge acquisition.
Unfortunately, proponents of scientific pluralism (such as Chang, 2012
and Longino, 2013) have been rather vague when it comes to clarifying
which of these two types of argumentative strategies they employ, leaving
an impression of their conflation. Nevertheless, the above discussion on
ABMs shows just how complex the latter strategy (arguing for the pluralist
methodology in terms of its conduciveness to the communal scientific goals)
is, at least if we are focusing on the efficiency of inquiry as the communal
goal. As we have seen, it is hard to estimate whether unrestricted interaction
among scientists is conducive to the efficiency of the given community, and
if so, under which conditions. Whether we might get more reliable insights
by means of empirical studies remains to be seen,25 but at this point, there
is no reliable information in view of which we could argue for the pluralist
methodology via this path.
Consequently, pluralists would be better off employing the former strat-
egy, showing the conduciveness of the pluralist methodology to scientific
goals of individual scientists, and in extension to those community goals
that directly result from the maximization of individual ones (e.g. there
24In (Straßer, Sˇesˇelja, and Wieland, 2015) we define the epistemic toleration as a con-
ditional norm, which is triggered if “the tolerated stance is considered objectionable and
in an important sense epistemically problematic” and if “there are reasons—namely, the
indices of [rational disagreement]—in view of which it would be wrong not to tolerate an
objectionable stance.” Epistemic toleration, however, has its limits and it is not triggered
if one has “reasons to consider the stance of the opponent as futile”, for instance in case
of “empirically backed up reasons to suppose bias or fraud on the side of the opposition,
the refusal to take part in argumentative exchange, a systematic reluctance to put hy-
potheses under critical empirical tests, systematic self-immunization from empirical and
argumentative scrutiny, etc.” (p. 128-129).
25Historical case studies may also be helpful, especially if combined with the analysis
of bibliometric data, in order to generate sufficiently broad evidence base. Such results
could also be used for the empirical embedding of ABMs as suggested by Frey and Sˇesˇelja,
2018b and recently employed by Harnagel, 2018.
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may be good reasons to consider the impartiality of individual scientists in-
creasing the impartiality of the given community). In other words, pluralists
would be better off showing how epistemic toleration and critical interac-
tion benefit the achievement of scientific goals of individual scientists (qua
scientists), irrespective of whether this results in a more efficient commu-
nal enterprise. After all, even if we obtained a convincing evidence (via
empirical or computational methods) suggesting that pluralist norms are
counterproductive for the efficiency of science as a collective enterprise, i.e.
that there is a trade-off between efficiency and other scientific goals, it is
not clear why pluralists would opt for the former.26
4 Conclusion
In this paper I have examined the current status of philosophical investiga-
tions into normative aspects of scientific disagreements by means of ABMs.
To this end, I have focused on two types of norms that guide a scientist
who has recognized she is involved in a peer disagreement: norms concern-
ing one’s attitude towards one’s own inquiry, and norms concerning one’s
attitude towards one’s opponent’s inquiry. In both cases I have provided
a survey of relevant ABMs and a discussion of conclusions that have been
drawn in view of the simulations.
Taking stock of this literature, the primary limitation and the primary
challenge to the employment of the ABM methodology appears to be their
validation, which would help in linking these models to actual scientific in-
quiry. Whether we have a case of a robust property across structurally differ-
ent models (as discussed in Section 2) or a case of different models providing
different results (as discussed in Section 3), ABMs need to be empirically
embedded in order to become useful for formulating normative suggestions
in the context of scientific disagreements. In addition, this process could also
benefit from a closer engagement with the literature on peer disagreement,
which would help with a better theoretical embedding of the models. This
especially concerns factors that are considered of epistemic significance, such
as higher-order evidence (Christensen, 2010; Feldman, 2005; Kelly, 2010b;
Straßer, Sˇesˇelja, and Wieland, 2015), which has so far largely been absent
from ABMs of scientific interaction (a recent exception is Merdes, 2018),
26As we write in (Straßer, Sˇesˇelja, and Wieland, 2015): “To caricature it a bit . . . do
we rather want a science where the scientists are individually rational but the scientific
machinery may sometimes move a bit slowlier than optimal, or do we want a scientific
machinery that performs most efficiently but where the scientists may sometimes put on
blinkers which make them suboptimal viz. slightly dogmatic epistemic agents?” (p. 145).
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though it may play an important role in the formulation of epistemic and
methodological norms.
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